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	<title>Comments on: Value, Bubbles, S&amp;P</title>
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	<link>http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/</link>
	<description>publishing, technology, media, philosophy, a bit of politics.</description>
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		<title>By: Felix</title>
		<link>http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/comment-page-1/#comment-8176</link>
		<dc:creator>Felix</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2009 23:22:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/#comment-8176</guid>
		<description>Well, the economics I&#039;ve studied doesn&#039;t have a whole lot to say about the stock market, other than it&#039;s hard to use it as a predictor or indicator of the health of the economy, and one reason is because it can be prone to bubbles and busts, systemically getting the price wrong. So it doesn&#039;t say much about a soaring stock market other than it&#039;s probably one of those cases. Economics, however, doesn&#039;t really have a good bubble theory, although the Austrian school kinda does. 

Part of the reason, I believe, is because mainstream economics relies upon a model of human behavior of maximizing individual utilities. Those models break down when people&#039;s utility functions can change other people&#039;s utility functions, as can happen when investors get too optimistic or too pessimistic, and this mood is contagious.

Which is why I&#039;m a fan of Paul Ormerod and his book, _Butterfly Economics_. A lot of people have also recommended _Black Swan_ to me, but I haven&#039;t gotten to it yet.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, the economics I&#8217;ve studied doesn&#8217;t have a whole lot to say about the stock market, other than it&#8217;s hard to use it as a predictor or indicator of the health of the economy, and one reason is because it can be prone to bubbles and busts, systemically getting the price wrong. So it doesn&#8217;t say much about a soaring stock market other than it&#8217;s probably one of those cases. Economics, however, doesn&#8217;t really have a good bubble theory, although the Austrian school kinda does. </p>
<p>Part of the reason, I believe, is because mainstream economics relies upon a model of human behavior of maximizing individual utilities. Those models break down when people&#8217;s utility functions can change other people&#8217;s utility functions, as can happen when investors get too optimistic or too pessimistic, and this mood is contagious.</p>
<p>Which is why I&#8217;m a fan of Paul Ormerod and his book, _Butterfly Economics_. A lot of people have also recommended _Black Swan_ to me, but I haven&#8217;t gotten to it yet.</p>
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		<title>By: hughmcguire.net &#183; The Jackson Hole Consensus: Central Bankers &#38; Assets</title>
		<link>http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/comment-page-1/#comment-8170</link>
		<dc:creator>hughmcguire.net &#183; The Jackson Hole Consensus: Central Bankers &#38; Assets</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2009 19:36:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/#comment-8170</guid>
		<description>[...] In my post about the the stock market bubble(s) of the past 15 years, I asked what kind of policy shift happened in the 1990s to allow such a significant change in stock asset valuation. The answer comes from Niall Fergusson, in this fabulous (and scary) interview in the Globe:  &#8220;Monetary policy evolved in a peculiar way in the 1990s towards de facto or de jure targeting of inflation, an increasingly narrow concept of inflation &#8211; core CPI. I thought it was a mistake at the time because it seemed to me crazy to ignore asset prices. Why differentiate? What&#8217;s the difference between pricing a loaf and pricing a house? Why do we care about one and not the other? In fact, we should probably care more about the price of a house than the price of a loaf, certainly in developed societies. I think there was a flaw in the theory there, that essentially you could call the Jackson Hole consensus. When the central bankers got together at Jackson Hole, the view that emerged from the debate in the late 90s was, we shouldn&#8217;t really pay attention to asset prices in the setting of monetary policy.&#8221; [more...] [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] In my post about the the stock market bubble(s) of the past 15 years, I asked what kind of policy shift happened in the 1990s to allow such a significant change in stock asset valuation. The answer comes from Niall Fergusson, in this fabulous (and scary) interview in the Globe:  &#8220;Monetary policy evolved in a peculiar way in the 1990s towards de facto or de jure targeting of inflation, an increasingly narrow concept of inflation &#8211; core CPI. I thought it was a mistake at the time because it seemed to me crazy to ignore asset prices. Why differentiate? What&#8217;s the difference between pricing a loaf and pricing a house? Why do we care about one and not the other? In fact, we should probably care more about the price of a house than the price of a loaf, certainly in developed societies. I think there was a flaw in the theory there, that essentially you could call the Jackson Hole consensus. When the central bankers got together at Jackson Hole, the view that emerged from the debate in the late 90s was, we shouldn&#8217;t really pay attention to asset prices in the setting of monetary policy.&#8221; [more...] [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Houssein</title>
		<link>http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/comment-page-1/#comment-8169</link>
		<dc:creator>Houssein</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2009 18:54:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/#comment-8169</guid>
		<description>hehe :-) right.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>hehe :-) right.</p>
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		<title>By: Hugh</title>
		<link>http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/comment-page-1/#comment-8168</link>
		<dc:creator>Hugh</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2009 18:45:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/#comment-8168</guid>
		<description>@houssein: heh. looks like that article could use an update:
&quot;In 2000, according to statistics at the World Bank the market cap to GDP ratio for the U.S. was 153%, a sign of an overvalued market. With the U.S. market falling sharply after the dotcom bubble burst, this ratio may have some predictive value in signaling peaks in the market. However, in 2003, the ratio was around 130%, which was still overvalued but the market went on to produce all-time highs over the next few years.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@houssein: heh. looks like that article could use an update:<br />
&#8220;In 2000, according to statistics at the World Bank the market cap to GDP ratio for the U.S. was 153%, a sign of an overvalued market. With the U.S. market falling sharply after the dotcom bubble burst, this ratio may have some predictive value in signaling peaks in the market. However, in 2003, the ratio was around 130%, which was still overvalued but the market went on to produce all-time highs over the next few years.&#8221;</p>
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		<title>By: Houssein</title>
		<link>http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/comment-page-1/#comment-8165</link>
		<dc:creator>Houssein</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2009 16:58:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/#comment-8165</guid>
		<description>stock markets are soaring &amp; GDP stagnant --&gt; overvaluation

See &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapgdp.asp?viewed=1&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Stock Market Capitalization To GDP Ratio&lt;/a&gt;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>stock markets are soaring &amp; GDP stagnant &#8211;&gt; overvaluation</p>
<p>See <a href="http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapgdp.asp?viewed=1" rel="nofollow">Stock Market Capitalization To GDP Ratio</a>.</p>
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		<title>By: Hugh</title>
		<link>http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/comment-page-1/#comment-8163</link>
		<dc:creator>Hugh</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2009 16:29:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/#comment-8163</guid>
		<description>@felix: &quot;Cutting costs means producing more with less, which means you’re increasing productivity or efficiency.&quot; sometimes. sometimes it means that your bottom line looks fatter for a brief while (rewarded on the stock market, which thinks short term), and then you are left with less ability to create value in your company.

&quot;borrowing money...&quot; I was not clear enough on that point. of course borrowing money underpins modern capitalism. but when debt levels/leverage get too big, you have an economy swimming on money without the underlying value creation. debt is useful. too much debt is great for a while, then not so great.

as for GDP vs stock index ... point taken (made above too). question: what is the economic orthodoxy when stock markets are soaring &amp; GDP stagnant? does that indicate anything in particular?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@felix: &#8220;Cutting costs means producing more with less, which means you’re increasing productivity or efficiency.&#8221; sometimes. sometimes it means that your bottom line looks fatter for a brief while (rewarded on the stock market, which thinks short term), and then you are left with less ability to create value in your company.</p>
<p>&#8220;borrowing money&#8230;&#8221; I was not clear enough on that point. of course borrowing money underpins modern capitalism. but when debt levels/leverage get too big, you have an economy swimming on money without the underlying value creation. debt is useful. too much debt is great for a while, then not so great.</p>
<p>as for GDP vs stock index &#8230; point taken (made above too). question: what is the economic orthodoxy when stock markets are soaring &amp; GDP stagnant? does that indicate anything in particular?</p>
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		<title>By: AJ Kandy</title>
		<link>http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/comment-page-1/#comment-8162</link>
		<dc:creator>AJ Kandy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2009 15:45:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/#comment-8162</guid>
		<description>GDP also includes negative activity. I think the Genuine Progress Indicator might be more useful. 

As far as Peak Oil affects the market -- there&#039;s not a 1-to-1 correlation, because energy sources reach a peak (the maximum amount of that resource is discovered, discoveries then tail off after that), production efficiency is so high with demand equally high, so that it creates inelasticity. We tend to see the effects ripple out in a delayed form.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>GDP also includes negative activity. I think the Genuine Progress Indicator might be more useful. </p>
<p>As far as Peak Oil affects the market &#8212; there&#8217;s not a 1-to-1 correlation, because energy sources reach a peak (the maximum amount of that resource is discovered, discoveries then tail off after that), production efficiency is so high with demand equally high, so that it creates inelasticity. We tend to see the effects ripple out in a delayed form.</p>
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		<title>By: Felix</title>
		<link>http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/comment-page-1/#comment-8160</link>
		<dc:creator>Felix</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2009 06:35:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/#comment-8160</guid>
		<description>Well, you might be onto something, but I do have a number of issues.

On your 3 ways of creating wealth, I would argue that #2 is really the same as #1. Cutting costs means producing more with less, which means you&#039;re increasing productivity or efficiency. A better shovel, in other words. I wouldn&#039;t consider the goal of layoffs to be wealth creation, but simply more of a firm&#039;s reaction to changes in expectations about the future. Just like households cut back spending and tighten belts in lean times, so do firms.

As for borrowing money, it&#039;s the main way anybody who doesn&#039;t have wealth creates wealth. If you want to start a business, you either use your own capital to fund it or you borrow it (or you sell shares, but that&#039;s typically a ways down the road). There&#039;s nothing unsustainable about that. Even boosting investment profits using leverage is sustainable as well. Sure, you have to pay back the loans, but your gains are so much higher that this is not a problem.

The problem with debt is that too much of it creates systemic risk. Which is part of what happened here. I don&#039;t think it&#039;s the main part. The bubble I think was mostly the Federal Reserve increasing the money supply too much, combined with investors getting sloppy because everybody was making money easily. And then leverage, derivatives. etc. amplified the systemic risk posed by the bubble.

I do think your graph makes a good case that there was a stock market bubble (and indeed, I don&#039;t think too many argue that point anymore). But GDP is a far better proxy for the economic value of the economy than any stock market index.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, you might be onto something, but I do have a number of issues.</p>
<p>On your 3 ways of creating wealth, I would argue that #2 is really the same as #1. Cutting costs means producing more with less, which means you&#8217;re increasing productivity or efficiency. A better shovel, in other words. I wouldn&#8217;t consider the goal of layoffs to be wealth creation, but simply more of a firm&#8217;s reaction to changes in expectations about the future. Just like households cut back spending and tighten belts in lean times, so do firms.</p>
<p>As for borrowing money, it&#8217;s the main way anybody who doesn&#8217;t have wealth creates wealth. If you want to start a business, you either use your own capital to fund it or you borrow it (or you sell shares, but that&#8217;s typically a ways down the road). There&#8217;s nothing unsustainable about that. Even boosting investment profits using leverage is sustainable as well. Sure, you have to pay back the loans, but your gains are so much higher that this is not a problem.</p>
<p>The problem with debt is that too much of it creates systemic risk. Which is part of what happened here. I don&#8217;t think it&#8217;s the main part. The bubble I think was mostly the Federal Reserve increasing the money supply too much, combined with investors getting sloppy because everybody was making money easily. And then leverage, derivatives. etc. amplified the systemic risk posed by the bubble.</p>
<p>I do think your graph makes a good case that there was a stock market bubble (and indeed, I don&#8217;t think too many argue that point anymore). But GDP is a far better proxy for the economic value of the economy than any stock market index.</p>
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		<title>By: Hugh</title>
		<link>http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/comment-page-1/#comment-8158</link>
		<dc:creator>Hugh</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2009 00:20:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/#comment-8158</guid>
		<description>@lindsay: i wonder though, what recent events would say about all that? would massive &amp; unprecedented bank leveraging + low interest rates (both of which = lots of money flowing around) be a more compelling explanation?

I think the housing bubble, while significant, was only part of a much more widespread problem.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@lindsay: i wonder though, what recent events would say about all that? would massive &#038; unprecedented bank leveraging + low interest rates (both of which = lots of money flowing around) be a more compelling explanation?</p>
<p>I think the housing bubble, while significant, was only part of a much more widespread problem.</p>
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		<title>By: Lindsay</title>
		<link>http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/comment-page-1/#comment-8157</link>
		<dc:creator>Lindsay</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Feb 2009 20:03:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hughmcguire.net/2009/02/26/value-bubbles-sp/#comment-8157</guid>
		<description>Hugh,

I&#039;ve normally heard the uptick circa 1993 explained in two terms:
1) The end of the Cold War led to a massive reallocation in capital away from the military/industrial complex (a hugely inefficient market) towards consumers (the invisible hand makes it much more efficient)

2) In the mid-1990s the productivity gains of investing in computers for a decade finally started to show up in economic stats.  (Literally, in the early 90&#039;s there were papers with titles like &quot;Why do we use computers as they do not increase productivity&quot;).

These gains in productivity led people to think that we were in the New Economy and since productivity makes everyone richer at no added costs, the S&amp;P jumped.

From there it was the Internet Bubble and then cheap capital led to the housing bubble of &#039;06.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hugh,</p>
<p>I&#8217;ve normally heard the uptick circa 1993 explained in two terms:<br />
1) The end of the Cold War led to a massive reallocation in capital away from the military/industrial complex (a hugely inefficient market) towards consumers (the invisible hand makes it much more efficient)</p>
<p>2) In the mid-1990s the productivity gains of investing in computers for a decade finally started to show up in economic stats.  (Literally, in the early 90&#8242;s there were papers with titles like &#8220;Why do we use computers as they do not increase productivity&#8221;).</p>
<p>These gains in productivity led people to think that we were in the New Economy and since productivity makes everyone richer at no added costs, the S&amp;P jumped.</p>
<p>From there it was the Internet Bubble and then cheap capital led to the housing bubble of &#8217;06.</p>
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